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ABSTRACT:    The present work has attempted to analyze sexual crimes and especially the crime of male 
rape. The international jurisprudence of international criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court 
has tried to qualify rape either as a crime of genocide in the form of serious bodily and physical injuries, even 
if not necessarily permanent (lett. b) art. 6 of the Rome Statute; or as a crime against humanity where there are 
elements of context and above all material elements that emerge from the definitions given by the ad hoc 
Tribunals and the elements of crimes; or even as a war crime in case it is implemented as a part of a political 
plan or design, or as part of series of similar crimes committed on a large scale. This behavior is rebuilt in a 
residual way compared to that of sexual violence, according to a gender specific relationship to speciem. The 
indication of the level of gravity of the crime is necessary for the relevance of sexual violence and rape as 
crimes against humanity that we will see in the next years from the panorama of international criminal law. 
 
KEYWORDS:  International crimes, crimes against humanity, crime of rape, ICC, SCSR, international 
criminal justice 
 
RESUMEN: El presente trabajo ha intentado analizar los delitos sexuales y especialmente el delito de 
violación masculina. La jurisprudencia internacional de los Tribunales penales internacionales y la Corte Penal 
Internacional han tratado de calificar la violación como un crimen de genocidio en forma de lesiones 
corporales y físicas graves, incluso si no son necesariamente permanentes (lett. B) art. 6 del Estatuto de Roma; 
o como un crimen contra la humanidad donde hay elementos de contexto y, sobre todo, elementos materiales 
que surgen de las definiciones dadas por los Tribunales especiales y los elementos de crímenes; o incluso como 
un crimen de guerra en caso de que se implemente como parte de un plan o diseño político, o como parte de 
una serie de delitos similares cometidos a gran escala. Este comportamiento se reconstruye de manera residual 
en comparación con el de la violencia sexual, de acuerdo con una relación específica de género con el tema. La 
indicación del nivel de gravedad del crimen es necesaria para la relevancia de la violencia sexual y la violación 
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como crímenes de lesa humanidad que veremos en los próximos años desde el panorama del derecho penal 
internacional. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Crímenes internacionales, crímenes de lesa humanidad, delitos de violación, CPI, 
SCSR, justicia penal internacional 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The latest military developments/actions in Syria (April 2018) remind us once again the 
“huge volume of overwhelming testimonies”, pictures and videos that document the so-
called report: “implementation of the Resolution establishing the international, impartial and 
independent mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible 
for the most serious crimes under international law committed in the Syrain Arab Republic 
since March 2011”2, led by the French court judge K. Marchi-Uhel, who has conducted 
preliminary investigations into a number of cases and cooperated with court judges that 
investigate war crimes in different countries3. This investigation has stated that: “evidence of 
sexual crimes is overwhelming, but the cases are so many that no prosecution can be 
brought for all”4. Despite this finding of “impunity” by international criminal law5 for 
serious sexual crimes6 jurisprudence still know proved that: international criminal law has 
been vital in fostering the understanding of sexual violence against male in armed conflict7 
as a weapon of war that targets not only a woman but a male role in international society8. 
The developments in international criminal case law, in respect of the recognition that sexual 
crimes fall within the scope of international war crimes against humanity and genocide 
                                               
2GA, 71th of 16 August 2017, A/71/75conflict5/Add.1. 
3G. ACQUAVIVA, War crimes at the ICTY: Jurisdictional and substantive issues, in R. BELLELLI (a cura di), 
International criminal justice. Law and practice from the Rome Statute to its review, Ashgate Publishing, 2010, 
pp. 299ss. 
4K. AMBOS, Internationales Strafrecht, C.H. Beck, 2018. 
5F. MELLOH, Einheitliche Strafzumessung in den Rechtsquellen des ICC-Statuts, Dunker&Humblot, 2010. 
6H. ABTAHI, S.A. KOH, The emerging enforcement practice of the International Criminal Court, in Cornell 
International Law Journal, 2012, pp. 1ss. S. MOUTHAAN, Sexual violence against men and international law 
criminalising the unmentionable, in International Criminal Law Review, 2013, pp. 667ss. 
7C. HENDERSON, Research handbook on international conflict and security, ed. E. Elgar Publishing, 2013, 
pp. 375-420. 
8C. EBOE-OSUJI, International law and sexual violence in armed conflicts, ed. Brill, 2012, pp. 146ss. K. 
AMBOS, Treatise on international criminal law: vol. 2: The crimes and sentencing, Oxford University Press, 
2014. C.S. MIBENGE, Sex and international Tribunals: The erasure of gender from the war narrative, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 
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crime9, have been overshadowed by the often frivolous treatment of these crimes by the 
international criminal justice10. 
The remnants that have prevailed over these centuries for these crimes, that they were a by-
product of the war11, or that in any case they are incidental and secondary to the main 
crimes, did not allow the provisions of the Statutes to be applied to a sufficient level12. The 
lack of previous international jurisprudence has found the international criminal courts in a 
position to be forced to make unstable interpretations or even to develop an important case-
law which has often been questioned by courts themselves13. The interpretations, of course, 
have often led to the departure from the mechanistic perception of justice and the adoption 
of the aim towards full recognition of the victims' human rights14. Other times, the principle 
of feasibility in the prosecution has prevailed, to such an extent that it has led to several 
cases of impunity for perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence15. These failures were 
complemented by the inherent difficulty of dealing with these crimes as a result of the 
                                               
9A/HRC/37/65 of 1st March 2018: Human Rights Council: Joint study of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence and the Special Adviser to the 
Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. See in argument: P. BEHRENS, R. HENNAM, Elements of 
genocide, ed. Routledge, 2013, pp. 194ss. Y. BEIGBEDER, International Criminal Tribunals, ed. Palgrave, 
2011. SÁNCHEZ REVERTE R.S., Referencia al crimen de genocidio aprocimation genocide crime, in Revista 
de estudios juridicos, 2016.  M.J. KELLY, The debate or genocide in Darfur, Sudan, in University of 
California, Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, 2012, pp. 208ss.  C. LINGAAS, Imagined identities: 
Defining the racial group in the crime of genocide, in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International 
Journal, 2016, pp. 80ss. R. MAISSON, Justice pènale internationale, ed. PUF, 2017. D.S. BETTWY, The 
genocide Convention and unprotected groups: Is the scope of protection expanding under customary 
international law?, in Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2011, pp. 102ss. H. BLAISE 
NGAMENI, La diffusion du droit international pènal dans les ordres juridiques africaines, ed. L'Harmattan, 
2017. K. CALVO-GOLLER, La procèdure et la jurisprudence de la Cour pènale internationale, ed. Lextenso, 
2012. 
10A. BABINGTON-ASHAYE, A. COMRIE, A. ADENIRAN, International criminal investigations: Law and 
practice, Eleven International Publishing, 2018. D. LIAKOPOULOS, Parità di armi nella giustizia penale 
internazionale, vol. 1, ed. Libellula University Press, 2018. 
11S. PARASHAR, What wars and “war bodies” know about international relations, in Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 2013, pp. 621ss. 
12K. AMBOS, Sexual offenses in international criminal law, with a special focus on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (July 3, 2012), in M. BERGSMO, A. BUTENSCHØN SKRE, E.J.  WOOD (eds.), 
Understanding and providing international sex crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher, Beijing, 2012, pp. 
144ss. 
13J. RAMJI-NOGALES, Questioning hierarchies of harm: Women, forced migration and international criminal 
law, in International Criminal Law Review, 2011. J. HALLEY, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the 
criminalisation of rape in the international law of armed conflict, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
2008, pp. 80ss. 
14N. PILLAY, Sexual violence: Standing by the victim, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 
2009, pp. 462ss. 
15B.S. BROWN, Research handbook on international criminal law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, pp. 86ss. 
A. COLE, International criminal law and sexual violence, in C. MCGLYNN, V. MUNRO, Rethinking rape law. 
International and comparative perspectives, ed. Routledge, 2010, pp. 49ss. 
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psycho-social impact of sexual violence on victims16. These difficulties are often 
insurmountable even at the level of domestic criminal systems, where correlations become 
even more complicated and inaccessible to resolving them. Even in the  most recent criminal 
courts judiciary officers were not prepared to deal with the broadness and specificity of 
sexual offenses. The lack of proper staff, the lack of understanding of the law, and the 
general politicization of many affairs, have led to results that are highly controversial and 
criticized17. 
 
2. Seeking the definition of rape in international jurisprudence through the 
elements of the objective and subjective existence of the offense 
One last question that first comes to the definition of rape in international jurisprudence is: 
can consensus be an element of rape in the context of international crimes? Despite the 
progress made in the case law of the international criminal courts with regard to crimes of 
sexual and gender violence18, the jurisprudence of these courts reflects a constant dispute 
over the understanding-and hence the proof-of crimes of sexual violence in the context of 
armed conflicts19 and mass violence20. The case law particularly reflects a doubt as to 
whether the victim's non-consent is required as an element in the persecution of rape21, but 
also how that element is interpreted. Subsequent cases of the International Criminal 
                                               
16T. BACHAROVA, The standing of victims in the procedural design of the ICC, ed. Brill, 2017. 
17J.P.L. ACEVEDO, The legitimacy of international criminal Tribunals, in Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 
2017, pp. 164ss. 
18A.M. DE BROUWER, The importance of understanding sexual violence in conflict for investigation and 
prosecution purposes, in Cornell International Law Journal, 2015. 
19G. CAGGIOLI, Sexual violence in armed conflicts: A violation of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, in International Review of the Red Cross, 2014, pp. 506ss. 
20M. MILANOVÍC, Establishing the facts about mass atrocities: Accounting for the failure of the ICTY to 
persuade target audiences, in Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2016, pp. 1325ss. S. MOHAMED, 
Deviance, aspiration and the stories we tell: Reconciling mass atrocity and the criminal law, in Yale Law 
Journal, 2015, pp. 1630ss. M. AKSENOVA, E. VAN SLIEDREGT, S. PARMENTIER, Breaking the cycle of 
mass atrocities. Criminological and socio-legal approaches in international criminal law, Hart Publishing, 
2018. 
21N. HAYES, Creating a definition of rape in international law: The contribution of the international criminal 
Tribunals, in S. DARCY, J. POWDERLY, Judicial creativity at  the international criminal Tribunals, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 130ss. R. HEFENDEHL. Grenzenlose Vorverlagerung des Strafrechts?, Berliner 
Wissenshafts Verlag, 2010, pp. 24ss. M. AYAT, Quelques apports des tribunaux pènaux internationaux ad hoc et 
notamment le TPIR, à la lute contre les violences sexuelles subies par les femmes durant les genocides et les 
conflicts armès, in International Criminal Law Review, 2010, pp. 789ss. P.V. SELLERS, Wartime female 
slavery: enslavement?, in Cornell International Law Journal, 2011, pp. 116ss. X.A. AGIRRE ARANBURU, 
Sexual violence beyond reasonable doubt: Using pattern evidence and analysis for international cases, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 610ss. S. STOLK, Imaging scenes of mass atrocity from afar: 
Maps and landscapes at the International Criminal Court, in London Review of International Law, 2018. 
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)22 and the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 
Rome23 proposed non-consensus as an element of crime by requiring that the sexual act be 
committed without the consent of the victim and that the perpetrator was aware of the lack 
of consensus24. Even in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSR), it has become clear that 
the persecution of rape25, even in the context of mass crimes26, requires proof of the victim's 
non-consent27. On the other hand, the Criminal Records of ICC28 do not explicitly require 
the prosecution to prove the lack of consensus29. However, they require that the offender 
commit a psychical invasion of a sexual nature against the victim by force or threat of 
violence or coercion30, misuse of power against that person or other person, or exploiting the 
enforced environment, or that invasion was committed against a person incapable of give a 
valid consensus, a sentence that remains to be interpreted by ICC31. 
                                               
22B. SWART, A. ZAHAR, The legacy of the international criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, pp. 298ss. 
23K. AINLEY, The International Criminal Court on trial, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2011. 
A. TIEMESSEN, The International Criminal Court and the politics of prosecutions, in The International 
Journal of Human Rights, 2014. 
24S. WHARTON, The evolution of international criminal law: prosecuting “new” crimes before the Special 
Court for Sienna Leone, in International Criminal Law Review, 2011, pp. 218ss. K.A. RODMAN, Justice is 
interventionist: The political sources of the judicial reach of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in International 
Criminal Law Review, 2013, pp. 65ss. H. OLÀSOLO, International criminal law, transnational criminal 
organizations and transitional justice, ed. Brill/Nijhoff, 2018. 
25See in particular the next cases: Brđanin case: Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin ICTY (A. Ch) 3 April 2007, 
Case No. IT-99-36-A.; Češić case: Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić ICTY (T. Ch.) 11 March 2004, Case No. IT-95-
10/1-S; Krajišnik case: Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik ICTY (A. Ch.) 17 March 2009, Case No. IT-00-39-A. 
Krnojelac case: Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac ICTY (T. Ch.), 13 March 2002; Case No. IT-97-25-T. Kvočka 
case: Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al. ICTY (A. Ch) 28 February 2005, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A; Plavšić case: 
Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić ICTY (T. Ch) 27 February 2003, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S; Stakić case: 
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić ICTY (A. Ch) 22 March 2006, Case No. IT-97-24-A; Zelenović case: Prosecutor 
v. Dragan Zelenović ICTY (T. Ch. I) 4 April 2007, Case No.IT-96- 23/2-S. 
26A. BOTTE-KERRISON, Responsibility for bystanders in mass crimes. Towards a duty to rescue in 
international criminal justice, in International Criminal Law Review, 2017, pp. 882ss. R. NOLLEZ-
GOLDBACH, J. SAADA, La justice pènale internationale face aux crimes de masse, ed. Pedone, 2014. B. 
MARTINS AMORIUM DUTRA, Criminal responsibility in the crimes committed by organized structures of 
power: Jurisprudence analysis in the light of international criminal law, in Revista de Faculdade de Dioreito da 
UERJ, 2012, pp. 5ss. 
27C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT HON, Victims before International Criminal  Courts: Some views and concerns 
of an ICC trial judge, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2011, pp. 476ss. 
28M. DEGUZMAN, The International Criminal Court’s gravity jurisprudence at ten, in Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review, 2013, pp. 476ss. A. BOWERS, International Criminal Court, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2011. 
29ICC Elements of Crimes, arts 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1 & 8(2)(e)(vi)-1. 
30S. STOLK, The victim, the International Criminal Court and the search for truth. On the interdependence and 
incompatibility of truths about mass atrocity, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2015, pp. 974ss. 
31G.P. STEWART, The International Criminal Court, in C. GIORGETTI, The rules, practice and jurisprudence 
of international Courts and Tribunals, ed. Brill, 2012, pp. 194ss. 
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Although rape was on the list of Act 10 of the Control Council32 as a crime against 
humanity33-although no prosecution for rape was made on the cases of this law and the 
constitutional provisions of the ad hoc international criminal Tribunalsas well as the Statute 
of Rome of ICC, and although implicitly refers to a number of international humanitarian 
law Conventions34 none of these gave a definition of it, leaving rape35  and other grievous 
crimes36 without some internationally accepted definition and during a period of time to 
create ad hoc criminal tribunals, in the early 90s37. 
                                               
32L. FISKE, Ending rape in war: How far have we come?, in Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An 
interdisciplinary Journal, 2013. 
33Article 11 defines the crimes against humanity as: “Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. See also: Control Council Law No. 10, 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity, 10 December 1945, 
3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-44 (1946). C. CHERNOR JALLOH, What makes a crime 
against humanity a crime against humanity, in American University International Law Review, 2013, pp. 287ss. 
J. WATERROW, J. SCHUMACHER, War crimes trials and investigation. A multi-disciplinary introduction, 
Oxford University Press, 2018. 
34A. SZPAK, Legacy of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals in implementing international 
humanitarian law, in Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2013, pp. 530ss. 
35K. KOENIG, A. LINCOLN, R. GROWTH, The jurisprudence of sexual violence-Sexual violence & 
accountability project, working paper series, Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, May 
2011, pp. 4ss. N.B. MAIER, The crime of rape under the Rome statute of the ICC: with a special emphasis on 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal Tribunals, in Amsterdam Law Forum, 2011. 
36International criminal law-Sexual and gender-based crimes-ICC outlines policies to improve prosecutorial 
outcomes. The office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes, in Harvard 
Law Review, 2014, pp. 796ss. F.D. NI AOLÁIN, D.F. HAYNES, N. CAHN, Gender and the forms and 
experiences of conflict, in F.D. NI AOLÁIN, D.F. HAYNES, N. CAHN, On the frontlines: Gender, war, and 
the post- conflict process, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 42ss. K.A.A. KHAN, C. BUISMAN, C. 
GOSNELL, Principles of evidence in international criminal justice, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 138ss. 
37In case: Kunarac we have a description, rectius definition of rape as: “(...) the trial panel found that the actus 
reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the 
vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of 
the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the 
consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s 
free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The men area is the intention to effect this 
sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim (...)”. In particular the 
Tribunal has affirmed that: “(...) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by 
the penis of the perpetrator; where such penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this 
purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the contents of the 
surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge 
that it occurs without the consent of the victim (…). See also: M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, P. MANIKAS, The 
law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publishers 1996, pp. 555ss. 
K.D. ASKIN, War crimes against women: prosecution in international war crimes Tribunals, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997, pp. 380-382. See also the case: Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal 
Judgment, par. 207 (ICTY, July 21, 2000): “(...) the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is 
constituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose 
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The absence of a commonly accepted definition of rape38 in international law proved a real 
challenge for the ICTY39 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
regarding the prosecution of sexual crimes40. The systematic rape of men in Rwanda and 
Bosnia eventually imposed the development of Court jurisprudence41 allowing them to 
contribute to international humanitarian law42 and human rights law43, particularly with 
regard to gender-based crimes44, a development that is clearly reflected in both the Statute of 
Rome of the ICT45 and the Statute of the SCSL46. 
                                                                                                                                                
must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances. The men's rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge 
that it occurs without the consent of the victim (...)”. P. WEINER, The evolving jurisprudence of the crime of 
rape in international criminal law, in Boston College Law Review, 2013, pp. 1210ss. See in the same spirit also: 
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, parr. 146–148. The second element of the actus reus of rape refers to 
the circumstances; “(...) which would render the sexual act in the first element criminal. The essence of this 
element is that it describes those circumstances in which the person could not be said to have voluntarily and 
genuinely consented to the act. The use or threat of force provides clear evidence of non consent, but it is not 
required (…)  true consent will not be possible (...) the last part of this element refers to those situations where, 
even in the absence of force or coercion, a person cannot be said to genuinely have consented to the son may 
not, for instance, be capable of genuinely consenting if he or she is too young, under the influence of some 
substance, or suffering from an illness or disability (...)”. In particular Paragraph 147 of the decision refers to 
the Kunarac appeal judgment as describing circumstances relating to “lack of consent”. The definition derives 
from the ICC elements of the crime of rape, where “lack of consent” was rejected as an element adopted, in the 
area was generally very difficult. It is unclear what this reasoning in Sesay (Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & 
Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Appeal Judgment, parr. 85–92 (Oct. 26, 2009)) was intended to accomplish. 
According to the Court: it may be deemed proven: “(...) if the Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused was aware, or had reason to be aware, of the coercive circumstances that undermined the 
possibility of genuine consent (...)”. 
38A. GRABERT, Dynamic interpretation in international criminal law. Striking a balance between stability and 
change, ed. C.H. Beck, 2015, pp. 68-73. 
39Prosecutor v. Šainović (Appeal Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-05-87-A Appeals Chamber, 23 January 
2014 ; Prosecutor v. Ðordević (Trial Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-05-87/1-T, 23 February 2011 at (2). 
40R.J. GOLDSTONE, E.A. DEHON, Engendering accountability: Gender crimes under international criminal 
law, in New England Journal on Public Policy, 2003, pp. 127ss. 
41H.K. MORRILL, Challenging impunity? The failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to 
prosecute Paul Kagame, in Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2012. D. BERGOFFEN, Ungendering 
justice: Constituting a Court, Securing a conviction, creating a human right, in Transitional Justice Review, 
2013, pp. 46ss. 
42A.H. OLÁSOLO, Derecho internacional penal y humanitario, ed. Tirant Lo Blanch, 2016. 
43A. ZWITTER, J.K. LAMONT, H.J. HEINTZE, Humanitarian action. Global, regional and domestic legal 
responses, Cambridge University Press, 2014. G. ZYBERI, The role of international Courts in post-conflict 
societies, in I. BOEREFIJN et al. (eds) Human rights and conflict: Essays in honour of Bas de Gaay Fortman, 
ed. Brill, 2012, pp. 368ss. 
44S. O'CONNELL, Gender based crimes at the International Court, in Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice 
Review, 2010, pp. 72ss. D. ROBINSON, E. WILMSHURST, An introduction to international criminal law and 
procedure, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 184ss. G. KIRAN, The protection of sexual autonomy under 
international criminal law: The International Criminal Court and the challenge of defining rape, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2012, pp. 376ss. S. BRAMMERTZ, J. MICHELLE, Lessons learned in 
prosecuting gender crimes under international law: Experiences from the ICTY, in C. EBOE-OSUJI, Protecting 
humanity: Essays in international law and policy in honour of Navanethem Pillay, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010, pp. 97ss. R. DUBLER, KALYK M., Crimes against humanity in the 21st century, ed. Brill, 2018. 
45K.J. HELLER, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in K.J. HELLER, D. DUBBER (eds.), 
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The Akayesu case is the first in international criminal justice to provide a definition of 
rape47. The ICTR, in its attempt to define this crime, initially concluded that there was 
indeed no established definition in international law and assessed the criminalization of 
crime in national jurisprudence in order to explore the general principles that have been 
shaped48. Although it found that domestic criminal codes have long Grabert defined rapes as 
“non-consensual sexual intercourse”49, the ICTR argued that it is necessary to provide a 
wider definition, aiming at taking into account the particular context of international 
criminal law and the peculiarities in its forms of violence recorded in Rwanda. According to 
the Court, “(...) variants of the act of rape may include the insertion of objects and/or the use 
of bodily cavities which are not inherently sexual”50. By providing a more liberal perception 
of rape, the Court ruled that rape is a form of assault51 and that its constitutive elements “can 
not be isolated in a mechanistic description of objects and parts of the body”52. In fact, the 
                                                                                                                                                
The handbook of comparative criminal law, Stanford Law Books, 2011, pp. 597ss. 
46T. HANSEN-YOUNG, Defining rape: A means to achieve justice in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in 
Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 483ss. 
47B. ABEGUNDE, Re-examination of rape and its growing jurisprudence under international law, in Journal of 
Politics and Law, 2013, pp. 4ss. X.A. AGIRRE ARANBURU, Sexual violence beyond reasonable doubt: Using 
pattern evidence and analysis for international cases, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 612ss. 
48A. GRABERT, Dynamic interpretation in international criminal law. Striking a balance between stability and 
change, op. cit. 
49N.B. MAIER, The crime of rape under the Rome statute of the ICC: With a special emphasis on the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal Tribunals, in Amsterdam Law Forum, 2011, pp. 148ss. A. FULFORD, The 
reflections of a trial judge, in Criminal Law Forum, 2011, pp. 216ss. A. BELTZ, Prosecuting rape in 
International Criminal Tribunals: The need to balance victim's rights with the due process rights of the accused, 
in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 2012. E. GEKKER, Rape, sexual slavery, and forced 
marriage at the international criminal Court: How Katanga utilizes a ten-year-old rule but overlooks new 
jurisprudence, in Hastings Women's Law Journal, 2014, pp. 107ss. 
50Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, 23 November 2001, para. 695. 
51S. CERNAK, Sexual assault and rape in the military: The invisible victims of international gender crimes at 
the front lines, in Michigan Journal of Gender and Law, 2015, pp. 211ss. 
M. 52Cherif Bassiouni argues: “(...) that rape was implicitly included in both the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters as a crime against humanity by being subsumed within the words or other inhumane acts (...) rape and 
sexual violence clearly constitute inhumane acts (...) rape was also implicitly included as a war crime by being 
subsumed within the term ill treatment (...)”. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, History of international investigations 
and prosecution, in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, International criminal law, Transnational Publishers, 1999. See 
also: The Tokyo Judgment. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-12 
November 1948. Edited by B. V. A. Röling and C. F. Rüter. APA -University Press Amsterdam 1977, 448. 
according to the Tribunal: “(...) Hirota was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that 
immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about the 
same result. He was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being implemented whilst hundreds 
of murders, violations on women, and other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction amounts to 
criminal negligence (...) from his own observations and from the reports of his staff he must have been aware 
of what was happening (…) that Matsui knew what was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to 
abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the City enjoining propriety of conduct upon his 
troops and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as it is now known, 
and he must have known (...) he had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the 
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ICTR made a correlation between rape and torture53, first of all finding that rape is torture 
and then stressing that the Convention against torture does not contain specific acts of 
torture, emphasizing the way this is done and the “idea” of the offense, rather than on the 
specific acts which constitute it, an approach which, according to the Court, is the most 
appropriate in international law. The Tribunal therefore defined rape as a “physical invasion 
of a sexual nature committed against a person under conditions of coercion”54. At the same 
time, the Tribunal attributed an equal definition to sexual violence in general, which includes 
rape, as “any act of a sexual nature committed against a person under conditions of 
compulsion”55. In particular, the latter stressed that it was not limited to bodily violation of 
human body and may even include acts that do not involve penetration or even physical 
contact. As regards rape, concluding that the use of part of the body does not necessarily 
have to take into account the incident of penetrating a piece of wood into a woman's and 
men sexual organs56. 
The extended definition of rape in the Akayesu case differs from the traditional definition in 
two ways57. First, the definition given by the Tribunal includes forced oral and rectal sexual 
intercourse, as well as the penetration of a finger or tongue into the vagina58. 
                                                                                                                                                
unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge his duty 
(...)”. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Crimes against humanity in international criminal law, Kluwer Law 
International 1999, pp. 348ss. 
53C. TOFAN, Torture in international criminal law, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011. 
54The Tribunal affirmed also, that: “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. 
Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute 
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military 
presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women (...)”. 
55C.A. MACKINNON, Defining rape internationally: A comment on Akayesu, in Columbia Journal of 
International Law, 2006, pp. 944ss. R.L. HAFAJEE, Prosecuting crimes of rape and sexual violence at the 
ICTR: The application of joint criminal enterprise theory, in Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, 2006, pp. 
206ss. 
56G. DEREYMAEKER, L. MUNTIGH, Sexual violence and torture in international criminal law. Amnesty 
International. Rape and sexual violence: Human rights law and standards in the International Criminal Court, 
in Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2011, pp. 48ss. 
57A.M. DE BROUWER, The importance of understanding sexual violence in conflict for investigation and 
prosecution purposes, in Cornell International Law Journal, 2015, pp. 5ss. K.A. DUCEY, Dilemmas of teaching 
the “greatest silence”: Rape-as- genocide in Rwanda, Darfur, and Congo, in Genocide Studies & Prevention: 
International Journal, 2010, pp. 312ss. According to Fountain: “(...) the Akayesu decision was considered 
revolutionary because it abandoned “mechanical” descriptions of rape, which generally required a certain 
degree of penetration and, most critically, a particular state of mind on the part of the victim (that is, of non- 
consent). Rather, the Trial Chamber held, rape is better determined as “physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed under circumstances that are coercive (...)”. C.J. FOUNTAIN CALEB, Sexual violence, the ad hoc 
Tribunals and the International criminal Court: Reconciling Akayesu and Kunara, in ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law, 2013, pp. 254ss. 
58P.A. BROUSSARD, Repair versus rejuvenation: The condition of vaginas as a proxy for the societal status of 
women, in Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 2011, pp. 936ss. 
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In contrast, according to the traditional approach of domestic legislation, these acts are 
classified as sodomy or some other forms of sexual violence59. Secondly, because this 
definition is sex neutral, the victim could be the man and the actor the woman. This 
perception differs equally from traditional law, since the latter perceives rape as a crime that 
only a man can commit against a woman, allowing incarceration of the woman only as an 
accomplice. This decision also has another pioneering premise. The Tribunal concluded that 
the magnitude of coercion required does not have to reach the level of physical violence, as 
“threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of coercion that exploit fear and despair 
may be coercion, and coercion may be inherent in specific circumstances, such as armed 
conflict60 or military presence of Interhamwe among Tutsi refugee women in the community 
office”61. 
The Tribunal, therefore, has only widely accepted the concept of rape and sexual violence62, 
but has also expressed a widespread perception of coercion by emphasizing the particular 
nature of sexual crimes in armed conflict and the need to bring closer the context in which it 
occurs63. Thus, the element of non-consensus is fulfilled, without the necessity of proof of 
violence or coercion64, since the burden falls on the perpetrator and the victim and the 
context in which the crimes of sexual violence were committed. This assumption leads to the 
further result of the elimination of the need to witness and cross-check the relevant 
deposits65, but also to the reluctance of victims to make detailed descriptions of the crimes 
against them66. As well as the analogy with the crime of torture in which the Tribunal took 
refuge, which does not contain the element of consensus. 
                                               
59D. LUPIG, Investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes before the International Criminal 
Court, in American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 2009, pp. 434ss. 
60J.L. LEATHERMAN, Sexual violence and armed conflict, Polity Press, 2011,  pp. 10ss. R. KOLB, R. HYDE, 
An introduction to the international law of armed conflicts, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. 
61M. ERIKSSON, Defining rape: Emerging obligations for States under international law?, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011, pp. 417ss. 
62L. VINJAMURI, Deterrence, democracy, and the pursuit of international justice, in Ethics International 
Affairs, 2010, 194ss. A.M. DE BROUWER, C. KU, R. RÖMKENS, L. VAN DEN HERIK, Sexual violence as 
an international crime: Interdisciplinary approaches, ed. Intersentia, 2013, pp. 123ss. 
63P. WEINER, The evolving jurisprudence of the crime of rape in international criminal law, in Boston College 
Law Review, 2013, pp. 1210ss. 
64X.A. ARANBURU, Sexual violence beyond reasonable doubt: Using pattern evidence and analysis for 
international cases, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 618ss. S .  GLESS, Internationales 
Strafrecht. Grundriss für Studium und Praxis, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2015. 
65S. NTUBE NGANE, The position of witness before the ICC, ed. Brill, 2015. 
66The Tribunal defines that: “(...) the cultural sensitivities involved in public discussion of intimate matters and 
recalls the painful reluctance and inability of witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details of sexual 
violence they endured (...)”. Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 687. 
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Coercion is therefore the element that characterizes the rape crime in international law: in 
the context of genocide67, crimes against humanity68 and war crimes69, when a sexual act is 
imposed on a person, the issue of consensus becomes redundant. 
Although the Akayesu case was accepted as setting an important limit of protection, it was 
also criticized that it was too broad, not quite specific and possibly as violating the principle 
of legality70. Alison Cole criticized the Tribunal for its failure in this case to follow the 
observance of two international rules when exporting the definition, the nullum crimen sine 
lege principle71, and identifying the correct sources of international law. However, the 
decision was generally welcomed, as many were the ones who praised her for her creativity 
and her contribution to the punishment of perpetrators of sexual violence72. 
The Special Expert on Violence Against Women and Men stated that the definition reinstates 
rape as an attack on the personal security of a woman as a person and not as a violation of 
the honor of the entire family or village73. As advocate General Louis Arbour noted, “the 
decision is truly remarkable in its broadness and perspective, as well as in the detailed legal 
analysis of many issues that will be critical to the ICTY74 and the ICTR, particularly in 
relation to the law of sexual violence”75. 
The definition of rape as set out in the Akayesu judgment was also adopted in the judgments 
                                               
67S. KIM, Collective theory of genocidal intent, ed. Springer, 2016. 
68M.H. ZAKERHOSSEIN, Situation selection regime at the International Criminal Court, ed. Intersentia, 2018. 
69R.J. GOLDSTONE, Prosecuting rape as a war crime, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 
2002, pp. 278ss. 
70A. COLE, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi: The new definition for prosecuting rape under international law, in 
International and Criminal Law Review, 2008, pp. 77ss. J. NICHOLSON, Strengthening the effectiveness of 
international criminal law through the principle of legality, in J. NICOLSON,  Strengthening the validity of 
international criminal tribunals, Brill/Nijhoff, 2018. 
71G.E. BARCO, Rückwirkung und die Entwicklung der internationalen Verbrechen. Elemente einer 
allgemeinen Konzeption des nullum-crimen-sine lege Prinzips im Völkerstrafrecht, Duncker & Humblot, 2018. 
72L. BIANCHI, The prosecution of rape and sexual violence: Lessons from prosecutions at the ICTR, in A.M-. 
DE BROUWER, Sexual Violence as an international crime: Interdisciplinary approaches, ed. Intersentia, 2013, 
pp. 125ss. D. NADJ, International criminal law and sexual violence against women: The interpretation of 
gender in the contemporary international criminal trial, ed. Routledge, 2018. 
73Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights Integration of the Human Rights of Women and 
the Gender Perspective, Violence Against Women, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73, 23 January 2001. 
74M. SHAHADUDDEEN, International criminal justice at the Yugoslav Tribunal, Oxford University Press, 
2012. M. SHAHABUDDEN, International criminal justice at the Yugoslav Tribunal-A judge's recollections, 
Oxford University Press, 2012. Y. SHANY, Assessing the effectiveness of international Courts: A goal-based 
approach, in American Journal of International Law, 2012, pp. 225ss. Y. SHANY, How can international 
criminal Courts have a greater impact upon national criminal proceedings? Lessons from the first two decades 
of international criminal justice in operation, in Israel Law Review, 2013, pp. 4ss. 
75Press release, ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Justice Louise Arbour, ICTY Doc. CC/PIU/342-E 
(4 September 1998). Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-I, Judgment of 27 January 2000, para. 226. 
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Čelebići76 (1998), Musema77 (2000), Niyitegeka78 (2003) and Muhimana79 (2005). In 
Musema, which followed Akayesu at the ICTR, the Tribunal, by adopting the broad 
definition of rape, as formulated in the Akayesu case and then in Čelebići80, once again 
underlined that “(...) the essence of rape is not the particular details of the parts of the 
body and the objects involved, but rather the assault expressed in a sexual manner under 
coercive conditions”81. Explaining the difference in the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc 
tribunals82, notably as regards the adoption by the ICTY 83 of a mechanistic approach to 
rape84, concluded that the conceptual approach to rape is preferable because of the dynamic 
continuum of rape understanding and its integration into the principles of international 
law85. He rejected the tendency to focus the problem on the sexual intercourse as a 
prerequisite for national laws to include acts performed on objects or parts of the body 
which are not inherently sexual86. The ICTR, however, did not refer to which national 
                                               
76Case No. IT-96-21-T, ICL 95 of 20 February 2001. 
77Case No. ICTR-96-13 of 16 November 2001. 
78Case No. ICTR-96-14 of 9 July 2004. 
79Case No. ICTR-95-1B of 21 May 2007. 
80M AKSENOVA, Complicity in international criminal law, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 189ss. C. 
FERNÁNDEZ-PACHECO ESTRADA, The international criminal Court and the Ćelebići test: Cumulative 
convictions based on the same set of fact's from a comparative perspective, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2017, pp. 692ss. A. ALIŇÁN, M. OLLÉ SESÉ, Estudios sobre derecho penal internacional, ed. 
Marcial Pons, 2018. 
81A. M. DE BROUWER, Supranational criminal prosecution of sexual violence: The ICC and the practice of 
the ICTY and the ICTR, op. cit., pp. 108ss. 
82L. DEREYMAEKER, G. MUNTIGH, Sexual violence and torture in international criminal law. Amnesty 
International. Rape and sexual violence: Human rights law and standards in the International Criminal Court, 
op. cit. 
83M. JARVIS, The practice of international criminal law. Some reflections from an ICTY Prosecutor, in 
International Criminal Law Review, 2017, pp. 400ss. 
84See also in argument the next cases: Prosecutor v. Halilovic,  IT-01-48-T, judgment, 16 Nov 2005 (Halilovic 
trial judgment), pars 401; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 15 Mar 2002 (Krnojelac trial 
judgment), par 39; Prosecutor v. Plavsic, IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing judgment, 27 Feb 2003; Prosecutor v. 
Rajic, IT-95-12-S, Sentencing judgment, 8 May 2006; Prosecutor v. Sikirica and 2 others, IT-95-8-S, 
Sentencing judgment, 13 Nov 2001; Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, ICTR-00-60-T, judgment and Sentence, 13 
Apr 2006; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, 1 Dec 2003; Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-A, judgment, 28 Nov 2007; Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, 
ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing judgment, 16 Nov 2007; Prosecutor v. Rukondo, ICTR-2001-70-T, judgment, 27 
Feb 2009; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, judgment and Sentence, 6 Dec 1999; Prosecutor v. Milan 
Simic, IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing judgment, 17 Oct 2002; Prosecutor v. Zelenovic, IT- 96-23/2-S, Sentencing 
judgment, 4 Apr 2007. 
85A. ZAKERIAN, M. ALIKHANI, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, activities and 
achievements, in Quarterly of Foreign Policy, 2013, pp. 7ss. 
86The Inter American Court has been using the sources of international criminal law to interpret the articles of 
the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and especially in the sector of sexual violence as we can 
see in the next cases: Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, (April 29, 
2004); Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, (Nov. 25, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Cases Nos. SCSL-04- 14-T-128-7347, SCSL-04-14-T-128-7363, 
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legislation it relied on to draw this conclusion, which, moreover, tends to delimit more 
precisely this particular offense. In Musema, the Tribunal finally chose the broad definition 
to include other forms of sexual violence beyond the narrow concept of rape87. It is 
noteworthy that the two ad hoc tribunals88 have not hesitated in the next few years to adopt 
the definition given in the above-mentioned judgments or to agree with its substance. 
Typical is the case of Čelebići, where for the first time it was attempted to give a definition 
of rape89. The decision provided a detailed examination of the historical development of the 
rape ban in international humanitarian law90 but concluded that there is no Convention or 
other international text providing a definition of the term91. After quoting Akayesu and 
agreeing with his reasoning, he said there was no reason to deviate from the ICTR 
conclusion on this issue92. 
The ICTY in the Furundžija judgment93 condemned the accused for the rape crime as a 
common violation of article 3 of the Conventions of Geneva of 194994, and largely deviated 
substantially from the defining definition of rape. Recognizing the absence of a generally 
accepted definition of rape in international law, the ICTY considered that it should rely on 
the general concepts and legal institutions common to the main legal systems of the world, 
                                                                                                                                                
Decision on lack of jurisdiction / abuse of process: amnesty provided by the Lomé Accord, parr. 36-38 (May 
25, 2004); Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia, Apps. No. 23052/04 and No. 24018/04, Judgment, (Jan 17, 2006); 
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160,  par. 306 (Nov. 25, 2006). 
87N.B. MAIER, The crime of rape under the Rome statute of the ICC: With a special emphasis on the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal Tribunals, in Amsterdam Law Forum, 2011, pp. 148ss. T. DOHERTY, 
Sexual violence and the role of the international Courts, in New Zealand Journal of Public and International 
Law, 2013, pp. 697ss. E. GEKKER, Rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage at the International Criminal 
Court: How Katanga utilizes a ten-year-old rule but overlooks new jurisprudence, in Hastings Women's Law 
Journal, 2013, pp. 108ss. 
88K. MARGETTS, K.I. KAPPOS, Current developments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2012, 448ss. 
89S.A. HAELEY, Prosecuting rape under the statute of the war crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1995, pp. 338 ss. S.K. IVKOVIC, Justice by the international criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in Stanford Journal of International Law, 2001, pp. 288ss. A. KALOSIEH, 
Consent to genocide? The ICTY’s improper use of the consent paradigm to prosecute genocidal rape in Foča, in 
Women’s Rights Law Reporter, 2003, pp. 122ss. N.K. KATYAL, Men who own women: A thirteenth 
amendment critique for forced prostitution, in Yale Law Journal, 1993, pp. 792ss. 
90M. MARTÍN, I. LIROLA, Sexual crimes in international humanitarian law, Institut Català Internacional per 
la Pau, Barcelona, 2013. S. MOUTHAAN, Sexual violence against men and international law. Criminalising 
the unmentionable, in International Criminal Law Review, 2013, pp. 668ss. 
91Prosecution v. Delalić, Case No. ICTY-IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 16 Nov. 1998, para. 478. 
92S. DE SMET, The International criminal standard of proof at the ICC-Beyond reasonable doubt or beyond 
reason?, in STAHN, The law and practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
93See also: Prosecutor v. Gagovic et al., Case No. IT-96-23-I, Indictment, par. 4.8 (June 26, 1996). Prosecutor v. 
Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, parr. 291-293 (June 17, 2004). 
94Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. ICTY- IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 43, 274. 
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avoiding too much of a legal tradition to end up a “precise definition of rape”95, and noted 
that due attention should be paid to national laws. 
In its research, the ICTY concluded that there was a tendency in the national laws of a large 
number of states to broaden the definition of rape to cover acts previously classified as 
minor violations and now the stigma of rape96 is attributable to an expanding category of 
sexual offenses, provided that certain criteria, such as forced physical penetration, are met97. 
He stressed, however, that there is a significant disagreement with the treatment of the States 
with regard to forced oral intercourse: in some states, it is classified as sexual abuse, while 
in other as rape. In order to resolve this conflict, the Tribunal found it necessary to resort to 
the general principles of international criminal law and, if no satisfactory conclusion was 
reached, to the general principles of international law98. By resorting to the general principle 
of respect for human dignity, he stressed that this principle is essentially the raison d'être of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law99 and protects individuals from 
violations of their personal dignity100, for physical assault or for humiliation of the honor, 
self-esteem and the mental state of the individual101. Based on this assumption, the ICTY has 
concluded that undoubtedly such a serious violation, such as forced intrusion, should be 
described as rape102. 
                                               
95“(...) in relation to torture by means of rape, and with reference to the prohibited purposes of torture: (...) 
torture by means of rape is a particularly grave form of torture (...). The violation of the moral and physical 
integrity of the victims makes rape a particularly serious crime. Rape is an inherently humiliating offence, and 
humiliation is generally taken into account when assessing the gravity of a crime (...)”. D.S. MITCHELL, The 
prohibition of rape in international humanitarian law as a norm of jus cogens: clarifying the doctrine, in Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law, 2005, pp. 224ss. 
96F. MÉGRET, Practices of stigmatization, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 2014, pp. 289ss. 
97A. COLE, International criminal law and sexual violence, in C. MCGLYNN, V.E. MUNRO, Rethinking rape 
law. International and comparative perspectives, ed. Routledge, 2010, pp. 49ss. 
98L. MAY, Z. HOSKINGS, International criminal law and philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 
202ss. 
99K. AMBOS, Castigo sin soberano? La cuestión del ius puniendi en derecho penal internacional. Una primera 
contribución para una teoría del derecho penal internacional consistente, in Revista Persona y Derecho, 2013, 
pp. 12ss. A. ASHWORTH, J. HORDER, Principles of criminal law, Oxford University Press, 2013. M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Crimes against humanity. Historical evolution and contemporary application, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
100N. VAN DER HAVE, The prevention of gross human rights violations under international human rights law, 
ed. Springer, 2018. C. JALLOH CHEVROR, A. MARONG A., Promoting accountability under international 
law for gross human rights violations in Africa. Essays in honour of prosecutor hasan Bubacar Jallow, ed. Brill, 
2015.  L.A. CAMARGOS, A responsabilidade penal internacional dos individuos: Estudo do caso Darfur, in 
Revista de Direito Brasileira, 2013, pp. 199ss. 
101K. ZEEGERS, A. OVERY, International Criminal Tribunals and human rights law. Adherence and 
contextualization, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, pp. 18ss. 
102“(...) the forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most humiliating and 
degrading attack upon human dignity. The essence of the whole corpus of international rights law lies in the 
      
                                                                                                            Número 1 
                                                                                              2018 
   
 
Before the Tribunal, the issue of breaking the nullum crimen sine lege principle was raised 
by the defense103, in particular because of the classification of forced oral intercourse with 
rape rather than sexual abuse, since it considered that this enlargement was very liberal and 
deviated from the traditional meaning of rape. This argument was rejected by the ICTY, 
adding that “there is no question of criminalizing acts that were not criminal when 
committed by the accused, since violent oral intercourse is in any case a crime, and indeed 
an extremely serious crime (...) in cases (…) violent oral intercourse is, as a rule, a distinct 
sexual abuse as it is committed in a time of war against unprotected citizens104. Thus, it is 
not just sexual abuse but sexual abuse as a war crime or crime against humanity (...)”105. 
Moving towards the wording of the definition, the Tribunal considered that the specialty and 
the precision in the determination of the objective status were considered necessary to 
ensure procedural guarantees. The Tribunal, therefore emphasized the distinction between 
rape, which is described as a crime against humanity in the ICTY Statute106, and other less 
serious forms of sexual abuse, which could be prosecuted as “other inhuman acts”107. 
It also stressed that rape should be seen as “the most serious form of sexual abuse”108. Thus, 
the elements of rape in international law, according to the ICTY, are considered as follows: 
“(i) sexual penetration, albeit mild: (a) the vagina or anal of the victim with the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the offender (b) the victim's mouth from the penis of 
the offender; (ii) coercion or violence or threat of violence against the victim or a Third 
                                                                                                                                                
protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her gender. The general principle of respect 
for human dignity is the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d'être of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law (...) and debasing the honour, the self-respect or the mental well being of a person. It is 
consonant with this principle that such an extremely serious outrage as forced oral penetration should be 
classified as rape (...)”, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. ICTY- IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 43, 274 
para. 183. 
103C. ROHAN, Z. ZYBERI, Defense perspective on international criminal justice, Cambridge University Press, 
2017. 
104P. KIRBY, How is rape a weapon of war?, Feminist international relations, modes of critical explanation and 
the study of wartime sexual violence, in European Journal of International Relations, 2012. 
105M. HALLING, Push the envelope: Watch it bend: Removing the policy requirement and extending crimes 
against humanity, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 828ss. C. ROBERTS, On the definition of 
crimes against humanity and other widespread or systematic human rights violations, in University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change, 2017, pp. 4ss. 
106R. DUBLER SC, M. KALYK, Crimes against humanity in the 21st
 
century, ed. Brill, 2018. 
107P. GRÉCIANO, Justice pènale internationale, ed. Mare & Martin, 2016. 
108J.R. MCHENRY, The prosecution of rape under international law: Justice that is long overdue, in Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 2002, pp. 1310ss. N. LAVIOLETTE, Commanding rape: Sexual violence, 
command responsibility and the prosecution of superiors by the international criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1998, pp. 94ss. D.A. NEBESAR, 
Gender-based violence as a weapon of war, in U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 1998, pp. 
148ss. I. PICCOLO, The crime of rape in international criminal law, International Courts Association, 2013. 
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Party”109. 
A very important element exerted by Furundžija110-the composition of which consisted of 
                                               
109A.M. DE BROUWER, The importance of understanding sexual violence in conflict for investigation and 
prosecution purposes, in Cornell International Law Journal, 2015, pp. 5ss. 
110See in particular the next cases: The ICTY Trial Chamber in case Furundžija drew a distinction between rape 
and any other forms of sexual violence on the basis of penetration: “(...) international criminal rules punish not 
only rape but also any serious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration (...)“. In case: Prlić et al. came 
to the same conclusion as Furundžija: “(...) rape is thereby prohibited, as well as all forms of sexual violence 
not including penetration (...)“. The ICC Trial Chamber in Bemba case required the invasion to amount to 
penetration: “(...) rape requires “invasion” of a person’s body by “conduct resulting in penetration, however 
slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital 
opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body (…) the invasion of the body of person to 
constitute rape, it has to be committed under one or more of four possible circumstances: (i) by force; (ii) by 
threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression 
or abuse of power, against such person or another person; (iii) by taking advantage of a coercive environment; 
or (iv) against a person incapable of giving genuine consent (...)“. The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Gacumbitsi 
concurred and developed this approach: “(...) knowledge of non-consent may be proven, for instance, if the 
Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware, or had reason to be aware, of the 
coercive circumstances that undermined the possibility of genuine consent (...)”. The ECCC Appeals Chamber  
in Kaing Guek Eav (“Case  001”) (ECCC, The  Prosecutor  v. Kaing Guek Eav, AC, Appeal judgment, case no. 
001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, 3 February 2012, para. 156), adopted a similar approach while limiting the purpose 
of control to the powers of ownership: “(...) the exercise over a person of powers attaching to ownership 
requires a substantial degree of control over the victim. There is no enslavement, however, where the control 
has an objective other than enabling the exercise of the powers attaching to ownership (...)”. The SCSL Trial 
Chamber in Sesay et al. SCSL, (The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon amd Augustuine Gbao, TC 
I, judgment, case no. SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009, para.163) concurred with the Appeal Chamber in 
Kunarac et al., while concluding that consent might be relevant to the exercise of powers attached to the right 
of ownership: “(...) whether or not there was consent may be relevant from an evidentiary perspective in 
establishing whether or not the Accused exercised any of the powers attaching to the right of ownership (...)”. 
The SCSL Appeal Chamber in Brima et al. (SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara 
and Santigie Borbor Kanu, TC II, judgment, case no. SCSL-2204-16-T, 20 June 2007, para. 704) overruled the 
Trial Chamber’s classification of forced marriage as sexual slavery, asserting the crime of forced marriage to be 
predominantly non-sexual in its nature: “(...) no Tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage 
was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. While forced marriage shares certain elements 
wipalmerth sexual slavery such as non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing 
factors. First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through 
the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with 
another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim. 
Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the “husband” and 
“wife,” which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. These 
distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime. The Trial Chamber, therefore, 
erred in holding that the evidence of forced marriage is subsumed in the elements of sexual slavery (...)”. The 
ICC Pre- Trial Chamber in Ongwen (ICC, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, PTC II, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, case no. ICC- 02/04-01/15-422-Red, 23 March 2016, para. 
88) concurred with the SCSL Appeal Chamber in Brima et al, holding that forced marriage may constitute 
“other inhumane acts“: “(...) not explicitly include “forced marriage” as a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. The question before the Chamber is therefore whether the conduct attributed to (the accused) (i.e. to 
have forced women to serve as “conjugal partners” to himself and other LRA fighters in the Sinia brigade) 
constitutes an other inhumane act of a character similar to the acts set out in article 7(1)(a) to (j) intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. This is largely a question of 
fact, but the application of the gravity threshold of article 7(1)(k) of the Statute is also a question of law, as is 
the question of whether the conduct described as “forced marriage” is not otherwise subsumed by the crime of 
sexual slavery (...)”. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Đorđević et al. Case Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Đorđevič et 
al. AJ, IT-05-87/1-A 27 January 2014 adopted a similar approach, considering that sexual violence may not 
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the court judges Mumba, Cassese and May-is that when giving the definition the Tribunal 
did indeed attach great importance to the general rules of interpretation of international law 
while relying on international texts, international criminal jurisprudence and human rights 
law, the general principles of international law, where necessary, and the general principles 
of law as emerged from the study of national laws. However, although he relied on the 
Akayesu111 and the Čelebići judgments, after finding that there was no definition of rape in 
international law, he did not consider them to fill the gap in international law112, relying on 
the absence of the principle of specialty in the conclusions of as above. Critical criticism of 
Catharine MacKinnon is that the Tribunal almost implies that: “without this declaration, the 
defendants-guards in the concentration camps accused of sexual abuse of prisoners-may 
not have known with sufficient precision that they were accused of committing a crime 
(...)”113. 
However, the definition of Furundžija is equally important for the explicit incorporation of 
                                                                                                                                                
require physical contact with the perpetrator where the acts constitute sexual humiliation or degradation: “(...) 
sexual assault requires that an act of a sexual nature take place. The Appeals Chamber notes that the act must 
also constitute an infringement of the victim’s physical or moral integrity. Often the parts of the body 
commonly associated with sexuality are targeted or involved. Physical contact is, however, not required for an 
act to be qualified as sexual in nature. Forcing a person to perform or witness certain acts may be sufficient, so 
long as the acts humiliate and/or degrade the victim in a sexual manner (...)”. See also: A.T. CAYLEY, 
Prosecuting mass atrocities at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), in Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, 2012, pp. 446ss. R. KILLEAN, An incomplete narrative: Prosecuting 
sexual violence crimes at the extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2015, pp. 335ss. S. SCULLY, Judging the successes and failures of the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, in Asian Pacific Law & Policy Journal, 2011, pp. 14ss. S. WILLIAMS, 
E. PALMER, The extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Developing the law on sexual violence?, 
in International Criminal Law Review, 2015, pp. 454ss. L. MAY, Z. HOSKINS, The extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia. Assessing their contribution to international criminal law, ed. Springer, 2016. 
111A. BELTZ, Prosecuting rape in international criminal Tribunals: The need to balance victim's rights with the 
due process rights of the accused, in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 2008. C. 
MCCAUSLAND, From tolerance to tactic: Understanding rape in armed conflict as genocide, in Michigan 
State International Law Review, 2017, pp. 158ss. A. HAGAY-FREY, Sex and gender crimes in the new 
international law: Past, present, future, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011. Y. WEITZ, Rwandan genocide: 
Taking notes from the holocaust reparations movement, in Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender, 2009, pp. 370ss, 
according to the author: “(...) the Akayesu Court ultimately characterized rape and similar crimes of sexual 
violence as both genocide and as crimes against humanity. This expanded definition, along with the subsequent 
prosecution of rape, is a significant step forward for women’s rights and has contributed to the development of 
international  humanitarian law as a whole (...)”. Cfr. S.T. DEUITCH, Putting the spotlight on “the terminator”: 
How the ICC prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda could reduce sexual violence during conflict, in William & Mary 
Journal of Women & Law, 2016, pp. 656ss. C. POWELL, You have no God: An analysis of the prosecution of 
genocidal rape in international criminal law, in Richmond Public Interest Law Review, 2017, pp. 26ss. S.T. 
DEUITCH, Putting the spotlight on “the terminator”: How the ICC prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda could 
reduce sexual violence during conflict, in William. & Mary Journal of Women & Law, 2016, pp. 656ss. 
112S. DARCY, J. POWDERLY (eds.), Judicial creativity at the international criminal Tribunals, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 138-139. 
113C.A. MACKINNON, Defining rape internationally: A comment on Akayesu, op. cit.. pp. 940, 946. 
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violence or the use of violence, along with coercion, as part of rape crime. The Tribunal 
concluded that all the case law investigated requires the existence of the element of violence, 
coercion, treat, or action without the consent of the victim114. It also placed particular 
emphasis on the definition given to the Prosecutor's preliminary summary, according to 
which rape is a violent act committed by violence or by the explicit or tacit threat of 
violence against the victim or a third person causes them reasonable fear of being subjected 
to violence, detention, coercion or psychological oppression. Thus, according to the Court's 
opinion, “all forms of captivity undermine consensus”115. It should be noted that, from the 
time when the Court relied on national criminal provisions to extract the definition of rape, it 
would have been more appropriate to rely more heavily on national laws criminalizing 
sexual acts among persons in unequal positions (such as guardians and food) instead of 
those criminal provisions that define consensual sexual intercourse in theoretical 
physiological conditions116. 
By making a critical analysis of the definition of rape, as it emerges from this decision, we 
see that it promotes a mechanistic perception of this and clearly escapes its extended 
delineation in the Akayesu case117. However, it can not be overlooked that the definition of 
Furundžija is precise and detailed, although it focuses only on the issue of penetration, and it 
also highlights the issue of consensus on sexual violations and its inherent non-existence 
when international crimes are committed. This definition therefore includes the sexual 
penetration of the female vagina118 or male or male anal with the penis of the perpetrator or 
any object used by the perpetrator as well as the sexual penetration of the mouth of a man or 
woman with the penis of the perpetrator119. Although at first sight, these three forms of 
sexual penetration can be considered as the only major forms of penetration, it nevertheless 
seems to exclude other forms, such as penetration of the vagina with the language or fingers 
of the perpetrator. However, since the Tribunal considered the main acts of penetration as 
                                               
114Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 183-184. 
115D. GUILFOYLE, International criminal law, Oxford University Press, 2016, 20ss. 
116W. SCHOMBURG, I. PETERSON, Genuine consent to sexual violence under international criminal law, in 
American Journal of International Law, 2007, pp. 138- 139. 
117B.A. OLWINE, One step forward, but two steps back: Why Gacaca in Rwanda is jeopardizing the good 
effect of Akayesu on women's rights, in William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law, 2011, pp. 640ss. 
118R. GREY, Interpreting international crimes form a “female perspective” opportunities and challenges for the 
International Criminal Court, in International Criminal Law Review, 2017, pp. 328ss. 
119R. GREY, L.J. SHEPHERD, Stop rape now?: Masculinity, responsibility, and conflict-related sexual violence, 
in Men & Masculinities, 2012, pp. 117ss. V.K. VOJDIK, Sexual violence against men and women in war: A 
masculinities approach, in Nevada Law Journal, 2014, pp. 925ss. 
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humiliating and traumatic to the victim, relying on the principle of human dignity, this 
fundamental principle would justify widening the definition of rape to other forms120. 
Therefore, while in its explanation, the ICTY laid the foundations for adopting a broad 
perception of the definition121,similar to that of Akayesu, it nevertheless appeared that it 
finally closed the door to adopt a conservative and largely incompatible position with the 
circumstances of the offenses122. Shortly thereafter, the ICTY came to reinstate the Kunarac 
case123 with the broad but concise and detailed concept of rape. Once again, the Tribunal has 
established that there is no definition resulting from customary or conventional international 
law, either international human rights law or humanitarian law. It then examined the 
definition adopted in Furundžija and, while adopting it in his first part, considered that the 
required coercion, violence or threat of violence was very restrictive. It therefore said that 
Furundžija's definition did not refer to other factors that would make sexual penetration 
unconventional or non voluntary on the victim's side124. The Tribunal also criticized 
Furundžija for the fact that, while examining the national laws of many states, it found the 
extent to which many of them perceived the element of non-consensus, but that conclusion 
did not include it in the final definition. Thus, the ICTY in Kunarac conducted its own 
investigation of domestic legislation125 and relevant case law in order to arrive at its own 
conclusions126. 
                                               
120C.F. DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, International law of victims, ed. Springer, 2012. 
121M. KARAGIANNAKIS, Case analysis: The definition of rape and its  characterization as an act of 
genocide-A review of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 1999, pp. 489ss, which claims that in Furundžija the 
definition of rape retained its extended form in relation to the Akayesu: “(...) it would seem that the broad, 
albeit more mechanical definition posited in the Furundžija Judgment does not differ in ts practical application 
from the conceptual definition born in the Akayesu Judgment and followed and applied in the Čelebići 
Judgment”. E. DOWDS, Conceptualizing the role of consent in the definition of rape at the International 
Criminal Court: A norm transfer perspective, in International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2018. W.A. 
SCHABAS, Crimes against humanity as a paradigm for international atrocity crimes, in Middle East Critique, 
2011. 
122C.J. FOUNTAIN CALEB, Sexual violence, the ad hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court: 
Reconciling Akayesu and Kunarac, in ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, 2013, pp. 4ss. 
123Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1 of 12 December 2002. 
124L. CARTER, M.S. ELLIS, C. CHERNOR JALLOH, The International Criminal Court in an effective global 
justice system, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. R. MULGREW, D. ABELS, Research handbook on the 
international penal system, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. SCHABAS, International criminal law, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012. M. AKSENOVA, Symbolism as a constraint on international criminal law, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2017, pp. 478ss. R. MULGREW, Towards the development of the international 
penal system, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
125R. STEGMILLER, The pre-investigation stage of the ICC, Criteria for situation selection, Duncker & 
Humblot, 2011. D. STEWART, International criminal law in a nutshell, in West Academic Publishing, 2014. 
126M. CHESNEY-LIND, A.V. MERLÓ, Global war on girls? Policing girl's sexuality and criminalizing their 
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The Tribunal has distinguished three categories of factors that often determine when a sexual 
act is rape in accordance with domestic criminal codes: i) sexual activity is accompanied by 
violence or threat of violence towards the victim or third person, ii) sexual activity is 
accompanied by violence or a variety of other special circumstances that made the victim 
particularly vulnerable or canceled her ability to make a conscious refusal; iii) sexual 
activity that takes place without the consent of the victim127. Thus, apart from point (i) 
“violence or threat of violence to the victim or a third person”, the Tribunal has introduced 
two more elements in categories (ii) and (iii). For category (ii) the court judges were 
convinced that by placing the victim in a position where he is unable to withstand, due to 
physical or mental weakness or in a surprise or misleading way, he is an element of  rape 
crime. Similarly, in category (iii) the Tribunal took into account the absence of consensus 
and any circumstance where the victim does not have the possibility of reasoned refusal as 
another element of the crime128. 
Note that this was recognized in the Furundžija case129, but was not included in the final 
definition. By proceeding with the analysis of the definition of rape, and after conducting the 
necessary investigation of legal systems that incorporate the principles to be adopted in the 
international context, the Tribunal held that “the objective reality of rape crime in 
international law consists of: sexual penetration, albeit of a) a vagina or anus of the victim 
with the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the offender, or b) the mouth of 
the victim by the penis of the offender, where this sexual penetration takes place without the 
consent of the victim. Consent to this end must be voluntarily given as a result of the free 
will of the victim, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The subjective 
nature consists of the intention to commit sexual penetration and the knowledge that it is 
done without the consent of the victim (...)”130. 
The definition adopted the traditional wording of the objective existence of rape. Part (a) and 
                                                                                                                                                
victimization, in Women and Criminal Justice, 2015. 
127C. SAFFERLING, International criminal procedure, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 97ss 
128J. KNOOPS, An introduction to the law of international criminal Tribunals. A comparative study, ed. Brill. 
2014. J. NICHOLSON, Strengthening the validity of international criminal Tribunals, ed. Brill. 2018. H. VAN 
DER WILT, C. PAULUSSEN, Legal responses to transnational and international crimes, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017. G. BOAS, P. CHIFFLET, International criminal justice, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017. 
129C. SAFFERLING, L. BÜNGENER, H. FARTHOFER, A. HARTWIG, Y. KOBERG, International criminal 
procedure, Oxford University Press, 2012. K. DE MEESTER, The investigation phase in international criminal 
procedure: In search of common Rules, ed. Intersentia, 2015. C. SAFFERLING, International Criminal 
Procedure, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 322ss. 
130Furundžija Judgment, op. cit., para. 80; Kunarac Judgment, op. cit., para. 440. 
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the first period of part (b) were taken by the Furundžija judgment. The definition of 
Kunarac, however, removed the phrase “coercion or violence or threat of violence”131  from 
the previous definition and instead adopted the “lack of consensus” as an element132. In the 
trial, the Prosecutor claimed that lack of consensus was not an element of crime, as opposed 
to violence and coercion133. However, the Tribunal separated its position from the 
Prosecutor, stating that the basic common element of the legal systems investigated is that 
sexual penetration constitutes the crime of rape if it is not truly consensual or voluntary on 
the victim's side134. 
It found that the elements of rape crime were not limited to violence, the threat of violence 
or coercion. The weight, according to the Tribunal, must be attributed to the violation of 
sexual autonomy because “the real common denominator uniting the various systems is the 
principle of criminalizing violations of sexual autonomy”135. Sexual autonomy is also 
violated whenever the person is subjected to an act to which he or she has not freely agreed 
or voluntary participated136. Thus, lack of consensus is the sine qua non of rape and the 
element of coercion, violence or threat of violence are only some aspects that can prove the 
lack of consensus. The question of consensus was raised by one of the defendants, Kunarac, 
who claimed that once the thief itself had testified that intercourse was on its own initiative, 
he could not have known that he did not consent. As the victim was in captivity and the 
initiative came from the threats that he accepted, the Tribunal found that he had not 
consented freely137. 
Moreover, since Kunarac was aware of the context of the war and the particular 
                                               
131I. MARCHUK, The fundamental concept of crime in international criminal law. A comparative law analysis, 
ed. Springer, 2014, pp. 117ss. 
132B.S. BROWN, Research handbook on international criminal law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011. 
133K. AMBOS, Criminal justice, in L. STAHN, N. NEDELSKY, Encyclopedia of transitional, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, pp. 284ss. 
134C.J. FOUNTAIN CALEB, Sexual violence, the ad hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court 
reconciling Akayesu and Kunarac, op. cit. 
135I. HAENEN, Classifying acts as crimes against humanity in the Rome statute of the International Criminal 
Court, in German Law Journal, 2013, pp. 89ss. 
136Para. 457-458: in argument of violence or treat of violence the Tribunal declares that: “(...) in practice, the 
absence of genuine and freely given consent or voluntary participation may be evidenced by the presence of 
the various factors specified in other jurisdictions-such as force, threats of force, or taking advantage of a 
person who is unable to resist. A clear demonstration that such factors negate true consent is found in those 
jurisdictions where absence of consent is an element of rape and consent is explicitly defined not to exist where 
factors such as use of force, the unconsciousness or inability to resist of the victim, or misrepresentation by the 
perpetrator”. See also T. BONACKER, C. SAFFERLING, Victims of international crimes: An interdisciplinary 
discourse, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013. 
137W.A. SCHABAS, S. MURPHY, Research handbook on international Courts and  Tribunals, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017. 
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vulnerability of Muslim women and men in custody138, and of the fact that the witness had 
previously been raped by several other soldiers139, the Tribunal ruled that the accused had 
concluded sexual intercourse with the victim, knowing in full knowledge that he did not 
freely consent140. In the Court of Appeal, the Court confirmed the definition of rape with 
some remarkable remarks. The Court of Appeal stressed that: “the conditions prevailing in 
most cases where there are war crimes against humanity are compelling”, concluding that 
under these circumstances “true consensus is not possible”141. 
Based on the facts of the case, including the de facto detention, the systematic and repeated 
rape of the victims, the Court of Appeal concluded that the conditions of detention and 
detention itself are so compelling that there is no room for consensus. The Court of Appeal, 
however, confirmed the definition, which in particular requires non-consent (and not 
evidence of violence or coercion) as part of rape crime, while at the same time holding that 
consensus is impossible under inherently coercive conditions common to most international 
                                               
138T.R. KARKERA, International Criminal Court's protection of women: The hands of justice at work, in 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 2004, pp. 202ss. 
139A. ADAMS, The first rape prosecution before the ICC: Are the elements of crimes based on a source of 
international law?, in International Criminal Law Review, 2015, pp. 1100ss. 
140See also in argument the next cases: Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (...) in this regard, courts have 
been willing to close certain proceedings to account for the concerns of witnesses. If a partial closure is 
requested, i.e., excluding only certain spectators, there must be a “substantial reason” for such closure, whereas 
a full closure to the public and press requires an “overriding interest” (...)”. Partial closures of the Courtroom 
have been justified on the grounds of a witness' fear of retribution from perpetrators still at large (Nieto v. 
Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743 (10th  Cir.), cert. Denied, 110 S. Ct 373 (1989)); to protect the dignity of an adult 
witness during a rape trial (United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 434 
U.S. 1076 (1977); Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.), cert. granted 468 U.S. 1206 (1983), 
vacated and remanded, 739 F.2d 531 (1984), in which protection of an adult prosecution witness from 
embarrassment was held to be sufficient for partial closure of a rape trial); and to protect a minor rape victim 
from fear of testifying before disruptive members of the defendant's family (U.S. v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349 
(9th Cir. 1989) see also Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 155 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361U.S. 842 
(1959) in which the reluctance and fear of a child witness in a rape case to testify in the presence of a full 
Courtroom justified closure of the Courtroom to all but press, members of the bar, and close friends and 
relatives of the defendant). Complete closure for a limited time has been justified to protect the safety of a 
witness and his family ( United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979)); to preserve confidentiality 
of undercover agents in narcotics cases (United States ex. rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975)). (...) Twenty-six state statutes allow for closure of trials to protect witnesses’ 
(...)”. Cfr. P. CLARK, Rape, sexual violence and transitional justice challenges. Lessons from Bosnia 
Herzegovina, ed. Routledge, 2018. N. BOISTER, R.J. CURRIE, Routledge handbook of transnational criminal 
law, ed. Routledge, 2015. A. CASSESE, F. JESSBERGER, R. CRYER, U. DÉ International criminal law, ed. 
Routledge, 2016. E. BIKUNDO, International criminal law using or abusing legality?, ed. Routledge, 2014. 
O.N.I. EBBE, Comparative justice systems. Policing, judiciary and corrections, ed. Palgrave, 2013. A. ESER, 
Comparative criminal law, ed. Nomos & Hart Publishing, 2017. L. GROVER, Child soldier victims of 
genocidal forcible transfer. Exonerating child soldiers charged with grave conflict-related international crimes, 
ed. Springer, 2014. 
141Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case IT-96-23 and IT- 96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, 
para. 129. S. BRAMMERTZ, M. JÁRVIS, Prosecuting conflict- related sexual violence at the ICTY, Oxford 
University Press, 2016. 
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crimes. But what is the difference between Kunarac and Furundžija? The Kunarac Court of 
Appeal stated that the Court of first instance did not reject the definition of Furundžija but 
simply “tried to explain the relationship between violence and consensus (...)”142. However, 
a more detailed analysis of the decision does not confirm this view. The elements of rape 
crime in the two cases are clearly different. In fact, coercion and consensus are traditionally 
two distinct elements, each of which must be met independently143. 
Violence, threats and coercion focus on the acts of the accused, unlike the consensus, which 
is related to the victim's mental state144. Given that Kunarac was the first case in which the 
Court of Appeal directly addressed the issue of the definition of rape, many other decisions, 
both the ICTY and the ICTR, relied on it and followed the definition it gave145. In 
Kajelijeli146 and Kamuhanda147 cases, it was accepted that rape was one of the reported acts 
of penetration, without the consent of the victim and knowing that this consensus was 
absent. 
In Muhinama, as in Musema, the ICTR has tried to reconcile the conflicting definitions of 
rape crime148. In this case, both the prosecution and the defense welcomed the conceptual 
approach of rape, as was adopted in Akayesu. The Tribunal noted that the Akayesu approach 
and the Kunarac definition are not mutually exclusive, but that Kunarac provided: 
“additional details of the constituent elements of the acts considered to be rape”149. Thus, 
according to the Tribunal, while Akayesu referred extensively to “physical violation of a 
sexual nature”, Kunarac attempted to specify its parameters of what constitutes that sexual 
offense of sexual nature as the rape offense. Considering the issue of consensus, the ICTR in 
Muhimana case considered that: “coercion is an element that can circumvent the importance 
                                               
142E. SCHRAMM, Internationales Strafrecht, C.H. Beck, 2018. 
143I. HAENEN, Classifying acts as crimes against humanity in the Rome statute of the International Criminal 
Court, op. cit. 
144W. SCHOMBURG, I. PETERSON, Genuine consent to sexual violence under international criminal law, in 
American Journal of International Law, 2007, pp. 138ss. According to Cassese: “(...) according to which the 
two definitions are essentially the same as coercion, violence or the threat of violence to imply the essence or 
to mean the absence of consensus (...)”. See: A. CASSESE, International criminal law, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, pp. 79ss. 
145Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 15 May 2003, paras. 344-346, Prosecutor v. 
Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Judgment, 1 Dec. 2003, paras. 910-15, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. 
ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, 22 Jan. 2004, paras. 705-9. 
146Case No. ICTR-98-4A od 23 May 2005. 
147Case No. ICTR-99-54A of 19 September 2005. 
148Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Trial Chamber Judgment ICTR-99-52-A of 28 November 2007. 
149C.J. FOUNTAIN CALEB, Sexual violence, the ad hoc Tribunals and the International criminal Court: 
Reconciling Akayesu and Kunara, op. cit. 
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of consent as evidence for the crime of rape”150 at the same time that the context of 
international crimes “is almost universal coercive, thereby undermining the element of 
consensus”151. 
However, the Muhimana case does not provide sufficient details as to whether non-consent 
should be the decisive criterion for rape crime, particularly in relation to the subjective 
nature of the offense152. Moreover, it is difficult to see whether the pure result of the 
Muhimana decision was to reduce Kunarac in an interpretative guide to the broad but bold 
definition of Akayesu, or to provide an almost emotional aspect to the conceptual definition 
of Akayesu, at the same time recognizing the necessary expertise provided by Kunarac. In 
conclusion, the Tribunal did not explain how it reconciled the differentiated definitions of 
Akayesu and Kunarac, but also how it applied the relevant definition to the facts of the case 
before it. 
Although Kunarac's appeal would normally have been a guide to all subsequent cases 
related to the rape crime153, however, the large number of cases of sexual violence before the 
ad hoc tribunals gave food to them for further discussion and investigation of the issue. This 
trend is reflected in the Gacumbitsi appeal case154 before the ICTR155, where  a different 
definition of rape was ultimately attributed156. 
Gacumbitsi was found guilty of genocide157 and rape for a crime against humanity158, which 
led the Tribunal to reconsider previous rape case law, concluding that the Akayesu and 
Kunarac judgments, although they have different approaches, can reconcile159. The lack of 
consent of the victim was proven by the fact that Gacumbitsi had threatened to kill the 
                                               
150A.L. CHOO, Evidence, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
151Case No. ICTR-95-1B of 21 May 2007. 
152N. HAYES, Creating a definition of rape in international law: The contribution of the international criminal 
Tribunals, in S. DARCY, J. POWDERLY (eds.), Judicial creativity at the international criminal Tribunals, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 146ss. 
153See for example: Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgment, Case No. ICTY- IT-97- 24-T, 31 Jul. 2003, para. 
755, Prosecutor v. Dragon Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. ICTY-IT-94-2, 18 Dec. 2003, para. 113. 
154Case No. ICTR-01-64 of 7 July 2006. 
155R.J. KABANO, The critical comparison of the Sierra Leone Tribunal with the international criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda: The benefit of hybridity of a Court, in Journal of Law, 2017, pp. 7ss. 
156The Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, ICTR, Appeal Judgment,7 July 2006. 
157M.J. KELLY, The parameters of vicarious corporate criminal liability for genocide under international law, 
in A. BYRNES, C. HAYASHI-MICHAELSEN, International law in the age of globalization, ed. Brill, 2013. 
158R. BEHRENS, J. HENNAM, Elements of genocide, ed. Routledge, 2013, pp. 194ss. Y. BEIGBEDER, 
International Criminal Tribunals, ed. Palgrave, 2011. 
159S.L. RUSSELL, BROWN, Rape as an act of genocide, in Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 
362ss. P.V. SELLERS, Sexual violence and peremptory norms: The legal value of rape, in Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 290ss. R.S. SÁNCHEZ REVERTE, Referencia al crimen de 
genocidio aproximation genocide crime, in Revista de Estudios Juridicos (Segunda Época) 2016. 
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victims horribly in case they resisted and the fact that those who escaped were eventually 
attacked160. During the trial, the Prosecutor claimed that the lack of consensus and the 
relative knowledge of the accused are not elements of rape crime161. Instead, according to 
him, rape must be preceded in the same way as torture and enslavement162, for which the 
prosecution does not have to prove the lack of consensus163. 
The Appeals Court rejected the prosecution's argument164. Having been consulted about 
whether the examination of the forced conditions à la Akayesu or Furundžija was the 
appropriate question or whether the lack of consensus was the appropriate legal 
interpretation, the Gacumbitsi Court of Appeal assured that the victim's lack of consent165 
and knowledge of the perpetrator the non-consent was indeed evidence of the crime of rape, 
which the prosecution has to prove beyond doubt. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal stressed 
that: the Prosecutor's Office can prove beyond any doubt the non-consensus by proving the 
existence of coercive conditions under which a substantial consensus can not be reached. As 
with every element of each offense, the Tribunal will take into account all relevant and 
admissible evidence to establish whether, in the light of the circumstances of the case, it 
must conclude that non-consensus has been proven beyond doubt. But it is not legally 
necessary for the Prosecutor to provide evidence of the victim's words or behavior or the 
victim's relationship with the offender. Neither does he need to suggest evidence of violence. 
The Tribunal is free to conclude non-consent from the surrounding circumstances, such as 
                                               
160Gacumbitsi Judgment, para. 325. 
161Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 147. 
162I. HAENEN, The parameters of enslavement and the act of forced marriage, in International Criminal Law 
Review, 2013, pp. 898ss. 
163See also in argument: Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned 
Majority Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the Admissibility of Evidence, 1 3 (May 24, 2005) 
(noting the prosecution's argument that the ad hoc Tribunals have routinely recognized acts of sexual violence 
as constituting crimes a 
164A. TIEMESSEN, The International Criminal Court and the politics of prosecutions, in The International 
Journal of Human Rights, 2014. 
165People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (holding that a statutory rape provision did 
not eviscerate the requirement of simultaneous act and wrongful intent); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 715–16 
(Conn. 1989), holding that: “(...) for the crime of rape, the perpetrator must only intend the general physical act 
of sexual intercourse and not the specific act of sexual intercourse without a person’s consent (...)”; 
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001), that “(...) no mens rea or knowledge as to the 
lack of consent has ever been required” to determine that a rape has occurred (...)”; State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 
1291, 1296 (Me. 1984), that: “(...) no culpable state of mind” is required when rape is compelled by force or 
threat (...)); see also Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, par. 1(1)(c) (U.K.), which providing as an element of 
rape that the accused “(...) does not reasonably believe” that the victim consented (...)”. Also see: I. 
MARCHUK, The fundamental concept of crime in international criminal law. A comparative law analysis, ed. 
Springer, 2015. 
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the evolving genocide campaign166 or the detention of the victim167. Consequently, the 
Gacumbitsi Court of Appeal held that the definition of Kunarac, both conceptually and de 
jure, prevailed. The conclusion of Gacumbitsi has sparked intense controversy and was the 
subject of academic and bibliographic criticism168. Schomberg argues that the unequal 
position of the perpetrator and the victim is an intrinsic element in cases where rape is 
committed during the war and ultimately leads to international crime169. Lack of consensus 
is not appropriate under international law once it is proved that the sexual act was committed 
in a context where sexual autonomy is generally absent. 
 
3. Definition of rape at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The SCSL also faced the need to define the crime of rape170. Initially, in 2007 in Prosecutor 
v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu171 the SCSL essentially adopted the corresponding definition, as 
expressed in the Kunarac case. Thus, the Court, in addition to the chapeau conditions of 
crimes against humanity, in accordance with article 2 of the Statute, has also adopted the 
following elements of the crime of rape: the non-consensual penetration of the vagina or 
rectum of the victim with the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the 
perpetrator or mouth of the victim with the penis of the perpetrator, of sexual penetration, 
and the knowledge that it is done without the consent of the victim. The victim's consent 
must be voluntarily given as a result of the free will of the victim, assessed in the context of 
the surrounding circumstances. According to the Court, violence or the threat of violence is 
a clear demonstration of non-consensus, but violence is not a per se element of rape, but 
there are other factors that make the act of sexual penetration unconsciously or non-
voluntary victim. However, in situations of armed conflict or detention, coercion is almost 
universal172. The constant resistance of the victim and physical violence or even the treat of 
                                               
166P. BEHRENS, Genocide and the question of motives, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2012. M. 
BERGSMO, C. WUI LING, Y. PING (a cura di), Historical origins of international criminal law. Vol. 1-3, 
TOAEP, Brussels, 2014. 
167N. HOGG, Women’s participation in the Rwandan genocide: Mothers or monsters?, in International Review 
of Red Cross, 2010, pp. 290ss. 
168P.V. VISEUR-SELLERS, The prosecution of sexual violence in conflict: The importance of human rights as 
of interpretation, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007, pp. 23. 
169W. SCHOMBERG, I. PETERSON, Genuine consent to sexual violence under international criminal law, op. 
cit., pp. 128. K.J. HELLER, What is an international crime?, in Harvard International Law Journal, 2018. 
170Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment. 
171AFRC Trial, Case No. SCLS-04-16-PT. 
172A.A.V.V., Jurisdiccion universal. Sobre crimenes internacionales, ed. Comares, 2013. 
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such violence by the perpetrator are not preconditions for proof of coercion. The Court has 
held the objective nature of rape can be established by the use of indirect evidence. 
Accordingly, the very particular circumstances of the armed conflict, where there are 
indications of rape on an extensive scale, coupled with the social stigma of rape victims in 
particular societies, make it difficult to prove the elements of crime173. That is why it is 
necessary to use indirect evidence to establish the objective reality of rape. Two years late, in 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, the SCSL174 adopted a quite different definition175. The 
Court, after reviewing the history of rape during wars, identified its elements as follows: 1. 
the accused violated the body of a person by acts that have the effect of penetrating, 
irrespective of gravity, any part of his body the victim or the accused with a sexual organ or 
the oral or rectal cavity of the victim with any object or part of the body; 2. the violation was 
committed with violence or threat of violence or coercion such as that caused by fear of 
violence, coercion, detention, psychological oppression or abuse against such person or 
other person or through the exploitation of the forced environment, or the violation was 
brought against of a person unable to give genuine consent; 3. the defendant had the added 
intention of causing sexual intercourse; 4. the accused had a reason to know that the victim 
did not consent. The Court rushed to explain how it reached the conclusions of the first two 
paragraphs. 
Assessing the first paragraph, the Court explained the broad perception of sexual acts, noting 
that the first element of the objective hypothesis defines the type of violation required to 
establish the rape offense and covers two types of penetration, even light. The first part 
refers to the penetration of any part of the body, either the victim or the accused with a 
sexual organ, while the phrase “any part of the body” includes genital, rectal or oral 
penetration176. 
The second part refers to penetrating the genital or anal cavity with any object or any part of 
the body that covers penetration with anything else, the object or part of the body, except for 
                                               
173A. SENIER, The ICC Appeals Chamber judgment on the legal characterization of the facts in Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, in American Society of International Law Insights, 2010, pp. 14ss. L. CHAPPELL, The gender 
injustice cascade: “transformative” reparations for victims of sexual and gender-based crimes in the Lubanga 
case at the international criminal Court, in The International Journal of Human Rights, 2017. 
174S. STEPAKOFF, When we wanted to talk about rape: Silencing sexual violence at the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, in International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2007. S. DANA, The sentencing legacy of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2014, pp. 620ss. 
175RUF Trial, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, para. 145. 
176SCSL-04-15-T, Trial judgment, 2 March 2009, para 143 (rape as a crime against humanity under article 2 of 
the Statute). 
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the genitals. The Court notes that this definition is broad enough to be sex-neutral as both 
men and women can be raped177. The decision attempted to clarify the role of the second 
paragraph, noting that the second element of the objective hypostasis refers to those 
circumstances that make the sexual act of the first element criminal. It describes essentially 
the circumstances in which a person has not voluntarily or genuinely consented to the act, 
whereas the use of threats or violence provides clear evidence of non-consent, but does 
not require its existence, since in cases where crimes are international, consent is almost 
universally impossible. With regard to the last part of this element, it refers essentially to the 
fact that even if there is no violence or coercion, it is not necessary for the person to have 
given his true consent in practice because he may be very young under the influence of 
substances or suffer from illness or disability. 
An important differentiation of Sesay178 is the analysis of the subjective nature of the crime. 
In fact, it requires the existence of a bilateral subjective hypostasis. Although the lack of 
consensus is not an element of objective fact, however, the accused must have some form of 
knowledge that the victim did not consent to the act. It should be noted that in the case of 
Charles Taylor179, where the accused was finally convicted of rape as a crime against 
                                               
177C. DOLAN, Into the mainstream: Addressing sexual violence against men and boys in conflict. Briefing 
Paper prepared for the workshop held at the Overseas Development Institute. Refugee Law Clinic, May 2014, 
1-12. 
178SCSL/04/15/Τ of 2 March 2009. See also: G. SLUITER, H. FRIMAN, S. LINTON, S. VASILIEV, S. 
ZAPPALÁ, International criminal procedure. Rules and principles, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 1576ss. 
R. BELLELO (ed.), International criminal justice, Ashgate Publishing, 2010, pp. 461ss. C. CHERNOR 
JALLOH, S. MEISNBERG, The law reports of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, vol. III, ed. Brill & Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2015, pp. 366ss. E. VAN SLIEDREGT, S. VASILIEV, Pluralism in international criminal law, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 285ss. C. CHERNOR JALLOH, The Sierra Leone Special Court and its 
legacy: The impact for Africa and international criminal law, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 234ss. 
V.O.O. NMEHIELLE, Africa and the future of international criminal justice, Eleven International Publishing, 
2012. 
179In Charles Taylor case, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: “(...) relied heavily on 
contemporary documentary evidence contained in the reports of international organisations and NGOs on, and 
media coverage of, the crimes committed in Sierra Leone in finding beyond reasonable doubt that the former 
President of Liberia was aware of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone by the RUF/AFRC forces against 
civilians, including rape (...)”. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Trial Chamber II Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, 18 
May 2012, paras. 6815- 6886. See also: A. GRABERT, Dynamic interpretation in international criminal law. 
Striking a balance between stability and change, op. cit., pp. 150-158ss. M. GLASIUS, T. MEIJERS, 
Constructions of legitimacy: The Charles Taylor trial, in International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2012, pp. 
230ss. C. CHERNOR JALLOH, A. MORGAN, International criminal justice processes in Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone: Lessons for Liberia, in C. CHERNOR JALLOH, E. OLUFEMI, Shielding humanity. Essays in 
international law in honour of judge Abdul G. Koroma, ed. Brill, 2015. S . J.  ROSE, Prosecutor v. Taylor: 
The implications for Bashar Al-Assad, in Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, 2014, pp. 
12ss. K.J. HELLER, The Taylor sentencing judgment: A critical analysis, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2013, pp. 838ss. R. DUBLER SC, M-. KALYK, Crimes against humanity in the 21st century, ed. Brill, 
2018. 
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humanity, the SCSL applied a slightly different definition to Kunarac, important elements of 
which, like the aforementioned decision, were finally included in the ICT for crime facts180. 
 
4. Definition of rape by ICC 
The Preparatory Committee of ICC was mainly influenced by the ICTY and the ICTR case-
law and the elements of crimes, a text intended to assist the Court in the interpretation and 
application of articles 6 (genocide), 7 (crimes against humanity) and 8 (war crimes). Of 
course, in ICC, the elements of rape are the same, regardless of whether rape is prosecuted 
as a war crime181 or a crime against humanity182. Thus, rape is defined as follows: 1. the 
offender violated a person's body by actions that resulted in the penetration, regardless of 
gravity, of any part of the body of the victim or the accused with a sexual organ, or of the 
oral or rectal cavity victim with any object or part of the body183; 2. the violation was 
committed with violence or threat of violence or coercion such as that caused by fear of 
violence, coercion, detention, psychological oppression or abuse against such person or 
other person or through exploitation of the enforced environment184, or the violation was 
brought against a person unable to give genuine consent. This definition of ICT is a mixture 
of definitions given by the ICTY, of ICTR and Rule 96185 of the ad hoc tribunals that is part 
                                               
180A. SHARPE, Sexual intimacy, gender variance and criminal law,  in Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 2015. 
181O. SVÁČEK, Brothers and sisters in arms as victims of war crimes. Ntagada case before the ICC, in Czech 
Yearbook of Public & Private International Law, 2018. 
182See from the ICTR the next cases: Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze, Nsengiyumva, ICTR-98-41-
T, judgment and Sentence, 18 Dec 2008; Prosecutor v. Bikindi, ICTR-01-72-T, judgment, 2 Dec 2008; 
Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, ICTR- 00-60-T, judgment and Sentence, 13 Apr 2006; Prosecutor v. Bizimungu 
(Casimir), Mugenzi, Bicamumpaka and Mugiraneza, ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Defence Motions Pursuant to 
Rule 98 Bis, 31 Oct 2005; Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana and Hategekimana, ICTR-00-55-I, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Severance and Leave to Amend the Indictment against Idelphonse Hategekimana, 
25 Sept 2007; Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T, judgment 
and Sentence, 21 Feb 2003; Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Kanyabashi, Ndayambaje, Nsabimana, Ntahobali, 
Nteziryayo, ICTR-98-42-T, Decision on Defence Motions for Acquittal under Rule 98bis, 16 Dec 2004; 
Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing judgment, 16 Nov 2007; Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, 
ICTR-95-1C-T, judgment and Sentence, 14 Mar 2005; Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A, judgment, 12 
Mar 2008. AGNEW, Acquittals in Mugenzi & Mugiraneza v. Prosecutor contribute to the weak legacy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, 
2015, pp. 8ss. 
183H. AHMAD, Context at the International Criminal Court, in Pace International Law Review, 2017, pp. 
132ss. 
184J.F. ALEXANDER, The International Criminal Court and the prevention of atrocities: Predicting the Court's 
impact, in Villanova Law Review, 2009, pp. 27ss. J. HAFETZ, Punishing atrocities through a fair trial. 
International criminal law from Nuremberg to the age of global terrorism, Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
185The Rule 96 defines: in cases of sexual assault: (i) notwithstanding Rule 90 (C), no corroboration of the 
victim's testimony shall be required; (ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defense if the victim: (a) has been 
subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological 
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of the rules and the proof process186. However, the ICTR definition avoids a clear choice 
between the elements of Akayesu and Furundžija, but rather seems to combine them187. It 
provides a gender-neutral definition188, predicting the physical penetration of any part of the 
victim's body as well as violence or coercion189. However, although any sexual penetration, 
according to the definition, may be rape, the sexual conduct of the perpetrator who does not 
consist penetration is not covered by the rape crime190. 
The condition of coercion has been broadly defined by ICC in the Bemba case191, where the 
ICC ruled that: with regard to the term “coercion”192 the Court notes that it does not only 
require physical violence193. On the contrary, threats, intimidation, displacement, and other 
forms of cruelty based on fear or despair may be coerced, while coercion may be inherent in 
specific circumstances, such as armed conflicts or situations of military presence194. 
                                                                                                                                                
oppression; or (b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, 
threatened or put in fear; (iii) before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy the 
Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible; (iv) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall 
not be admitted in evidence or as defense. See, Rule 96 of Evidence and Procedure (UN Doc. IT/32, 1 Feb. 
1994). Position adopted in case: Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY trial Chamber explained: “(...) that the rule 
rejecting a corroboration requirement in sexual assault cases accords to the testimony of a victim of sexual 
assault the same presumption of reliability as the testimony of victims of other crimes, something long denied 
to victims of sexual assault by the common law (...)”. See also in argument: ROTSCH, Criminal evidence, ed. 
Nomos, 2015. 
186H. SATZGER, W. SCHLUCKEBIER, G. WIDMAIER, Strafprozessordung (StPO), Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
2017. 
187P.V. VISEUR-SELLERS, Gender strategy is not a luxury for international Courts, in American University 
Gender, Society Policy & Law, 2009, pp. 302ss. 
188See in particular the next doctrine work: A. HAGAY-FREY, Sex and gender crimes  in the new international 
law: Past, present, future, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp. 80ss. 
189L. CHAPPELL, The politics of gender justice at the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, 
2016, pp. 266ss. M. JO RATKE, B.A. SIMMONS, Assessing the International criminal Court, in T. 
SQUATRITO, O.R. YOUNG, A. FOLLESDAL, G. ULSTEIN, The performance of international courts and 
Tribunals, Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
190S. MOUTHAAN, The prosecution of gender-based crimes at the ICC: Challenges and opportunities, in 
International Criminal Law Review, 2011, pp. 776ss. 
191ICC-01/05-01/08 of 21 March 2016. F. O’REGAN, Prosecutor vs. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo: The 
cumulative charging principle, Gender-based violence, and expressivism, in Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 2012, pp. 1344ss. 
192K. AMBOS, C. ACKERMAN, Liber amicorum Mirjam Damaška. Beitäge zum Internationalen und 
Europäischen Strafrecht, Duncker & Humblot, 2016. 
193In argument see also: the United Kingdom launched an initiative on preventing sexual violence in conflict, 
aimed, inter alia, at strengthening international efforts and coordination, and supporting states in building their 
national capacity to prosecute acts of sexual violence committed during conflict. See the G8 Declaration on 
Preventing sexual violence in conflict, 11 April 2013. The African Solidarity Initiative, a program launched by 
the African Union (“AU”) in 2012 to mobilize support for post-conflict reconstruction, has also brought about 
consultations with the objective of formulating an AU-led strategic framework for the prevention of, and 
response to, sexual violence in Africa. See: The concept note on high-level consultation on preventing and 
responding to sexual violence in conflict, post- conflict countries and beyond, 9-11 October 2013. 
194ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to article 61(7) and (b) on the Charges 
against Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05- 01/08, 15 June 2009 (Bemba Confirmation 
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It remains to be seen, however, how the ICTY and ICTR will further specify in its case-law 
each of the elements of crime, which are to be clarified in accordance with international 
criminal law and which procedural rules will be applied to ensure that it will not be required 
to the lack of consensus of the victim. It should also be noted that this definition is quite 
convincing and has been copied in the laws created by the Courts of Cambodia 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia-ECCC)195 and the special panels for 
serious crimes in East Timor196, which have already been issued a conviction for the rape 
crime in the Cardoso case197. I suggest that they are worth exploring, as they hold out the 
possibility of complementing the inevitably limited narratives which emerge through 
criminal proceedings and bringing us closer to making the more complex and subtle 
narratives of women's and men experiences “fully visible”198. 
In the end, we can say that the extensive efforts of court judges in the ICTY and ICTR to 
identify and develop the definition of rape as an international crime199 provides a classic 
illustration of the operation of the case-law interpretation200. Akayesu is the perfect 
archetype of jurisprudence201, while Furundžιja and Kunarac propose a more cautious 
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195S. SÁCOUTO, Victim participation at the international Criminal Court and the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia: A feminist project, in Michigan Journal of Gender & Law, 2012, pp. 298ss. E. 
PALMER, S.J. WILLIAMS, A “shift in attitude”? Institutional change and sexual and gender-based crimes at 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2017. S. 
MEISENBERG, The extraordinary Chambers in the Courts in Cambodia. Assessing their contribution to 
international criminal law, ed. Springer, 2016. R.C. DEFALCO, Accounting for famine at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The crimes against humanity of extermination, inhumane acts and 
persecution, in The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2011. 
196D. SCHEFFER, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
International Criminal Law, ed. Brill, 2008, pag. 253: noting that: “(...) the ECCC (...) was never conceived of 
by those who negotiated its creation as an instrument of direct relief for victims, although the protection and 
use of victims as witnesses in the investigations and trials is addressed in detail (...) there is no express 
provision in the agreement, as adopted, entitling victims to participate (...)”. See also Agreement between the 
United Nations and the royal government of Cambodia concerning the prosecution under Cambodian law of 
crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S 1-41273. The 
Cambodian law implementing the agreement and establishing the ECCC references a right of victims to appeal 
against decisions of the ECCC Trial Chamber, it does not otherwise expressly permit victims to participate in 
ECCC proceedings. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Republic of Kampuchea, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 004). 
197The Prosecutor v. Jose Cardoso Fereira, Case No 04/2001, 5 April 2003. 
198K. AMBOS, I. STEGMILLER, Prosecuting international crimes at the International Criminal Court: Is there 
a coherent and comprehensive prosecution strategy?, in Crime, Law and Social Change, 2013. 
199K.J. HELLER, What is an international crime?, in Harvard International Law Journal, 2018. 
200M. DE GUZMAN, How serious are international crimes? The gravity problem in international criminal law, 
in Columbia Journal of Transnational law, 2012, pp. 20ss. 
201K. CHIEDU MOGHALU, International humanitarian law from Nuremberg to Rome: The weighty 
precedents of the international criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Pace International Law Review, 2002, pp. 
285ss. 
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approach, quite detailed, based on the principle of speciality. At the same time, other 
decisions, such as Musema and Muhimana202, attempt to create a harmonious interpretation 
of existing case law. However, although these efforts have been a milestone in international 
criminal jurisprudence and contributed to the development of international criminal law, this 
issue continues to concern the courts and academics. The contradictory versions at times 
raises a number of concerns in the context of human rights law, and in particular the impact 
that different and often conflicting definitions may have on the right to equal access to 
justice. As Patricia Viseur Sellers points out, different definitions of rape may result in a 16-
year-old men in the civil war in Sierra Leone203 being less protected from gay violence than 
a 16- year-old men who has been sexually abused by an actor, who will be tried before the 
ICC204. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In practice, the two international criminal tribunals have acknowledged that sexual violence 
can constitute a bunch of other additional crimes, including war crimes of torture205 and 
attacks on personal dignity206, the crime against humanity not only of rape but also of sexual 
enslavement207, persecution, and the crime of genocide208. With regard to ICC, the statute of 
the latter includes specific gender-based crimes, such as rape, sexual slavery, forced 
prostitution, pregnancy and sterilization-on the basis of both war crime209 and crimes against 
humanity210. As regards the crimes of genocide, the elements of crimes state that although 
rape is not listed as a form of genocide, the latter caused by acts of “serious physical or 
                                               
202A. NOVAK, The International Criminal Court: An Introduction, ed. Springer, 2015. 
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mental harm”211, including “acts of torture, rape, sexual violence, inhuman or degrading 
treatment”212. However, the process of joining an act of sexual violence in the formal legal 
arena may be a painful process of many victims213. Not only can they experience a 
tremendous psychological strain because they have to go ahead and tell the violations 
against it214, but they may be forced to confront it with the established gender bias and rape 
perceptions of the system itself responsible for providing justice. 
Obstacles to the process are multiple: lack of effective cooperation between health care staff 
and legal system, structural and resource constraints on law enforcement, lack of forensic 
analysis and problems of the courts themselves. Poor cooperation between investigators and 
prosecutors and the consequent inability to prove or attribute accusations and finally lack of 
sensitivity to judicial proceedings that “reconstitute” the victim's trauma215. But besides the 
victims, researchers and prosecutors may in turn encounter specific challenges, as they 
promote a case of sexual violence through the legal system. Besides the victims, researchers 
and prosecutors may in turn encounter specific challenges, as they promote a case of sexual 
violence through the legal system. The often private character of rape216, for example, rarely 
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offers the possibility of eyewitnesses, support that can be provided to other crimes. And 
whether the subject is the identity of the offender or the lack of consensus on sexual 
intercourse, prosecutors are often called upon to fight against gender bias or misconceptions 
about the nature of sexual violence. 
With regard to the proof of international sex crimes217, additional proofs arise: how can one 
collect consistent evidence of a crimes committed against countless people after many 
years? how can one assign responsibility to a military or political commander who may have 
never given a direct or immediate mandate to commit rape? 
There are, however, many promising strategies for managing cases of sexual violence. These 
strategies have evolved, both in the domestic and international contexts. These may consist 
either of efforts to integrate awareness of sexual violence (as well as universal education 
across the range of research) or inter tactics aimed at developing expertise in the field of 
sexual violence crimes within the body of experts218. Innovations within an international 
body may have a significant impact on future developments within national or local criminal 
justice systems, including a context of more extensive use of gender experts, increased 
coordination between prosecutors and investigations and the increased protection measures 
of witnesses219. 
Indeed, the new Prosecutor's Office paper on gender and sexual crimes provides a set of 
coherent and integrated goals towards more effective justice and recognition of the harm 
suffered by victims of sexual and gender-based violence, in the context of permanent 
international jurisdiction instrument. Whether the ICC will eventually become the catalyst 
for the eradication of sexual violence, mainly as a weapon220 or war strategy221, and how 
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soon it will be demonstrated by the progress it will make in the next period222. 
Already documented cases of sexual violence in Colombia223 offer an excellent opportunity 
to the Prosecutor's Office to apply this new approach that has been adopted in the policy 
document. Besides, the ICC already has reason to believe that the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) committed crimes against the civilian population in 
Colombia224, which are violations of the Rome Statute225, and has already stated that it will 
proceed to prosecution of the international crimes committed in Colombia if the Colombian 
government does not manage to do so effectively. While international law provides the 
platform for the recognition of a set of universal rights, it is only the starting point from 
which the appropriate approach to justice will be diversified. Although the ICC is currently 
focusing on the investigation of situations in African countries and not only226, it is crucial to 
distinguish the details of sexual violence in different contexts in order to formulate 
responses that respond to the particular need of survivors and communities, and this can 
achieved only if survivors are incorporated into the process of redefining how they see 
justice themselves, especially in ways that fit their country's political history and culture. If 
the ICC wants to play the role of deterring the most serious human tights violations and 
make progress to that end, it must integrate gender equality more prominently across the 
range of proceedings before the Court227. 
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